By Tony Edike
From alleged attacks near security checkpoints to ransom payments, forest hideouts and repeated abductions along major highways, Kogi State faces urgent questions about the effectiveness of its security architecture. Governor Usman Ododo must move beyond security announcements to a sustained, transparent campaign capable of dismantling kidnapping networks and restoring public confidence.
Kogi State occupies a strategic position in Nigeria’s geography, connecting different parts of the country through major highways and serving as a vital corridor for commercial vehicles, inter-state travellers, students, civil servants and families travelling between the North and South.
Yet, this strategic advantage has increasingly been overshadowed by a disturbing security challenge: the persistent abduction of travellers, the exploitation of forested areas by armed criminal groups, the payment of huge ransoms and the loss of innocent lives.
16 kidnap victims inside a military vehicle after their rescue in Kogi State in August 2026
For many Nigerians travelling through Kogi, the journey has become a source of anxiety. A routine road trip can turn into a nightmare when armed men emerge from the bush, force passengers out of their vehicles and march them into forests where their families may spend days or weeks negotiating for their release.
The tragedy extends beyond those abducted. Families are forced to sell property, borrow money, exhaust their savings and appeal to relatives and well-wishers to raise ransom payments. In some cases, even after enormous sums have reportedly been paid, victims have not returned home alive.
This is a security crisis that demands more than public assurances, occasional rescue operations and declarations that criminals will be defeated. It requires a sustained, intelligence-driven campaign capable of making kidnapping a difficult and unprofitable enterprise.
But beyond the immediate problem of armed men operating in forests and along highways, disturbing questions have emerged from accounts attributed to some kidnapping victims. These include allegations that certain abductions occurred close to Army or police checkpoints, raising concerns about the effectiveness of security surveillance and the possibility of criminal collaboration by individuals entrusted with protecting the public.
Such allegations must not be dismissed. Neither should they be accepted as established facts without investigation. They require an independent, thorough and transparent inquiry.
The disturbing evidence behind Kogi’s insecurity
Available reports show that kidnapping in Kogi is not an isolated problem.
A November 2025 report by the European Union Agency for Asylum, drawing on Nigerian security research, cited different estimates of kidnapping victims in Kogi during 2024. Nextier recorded 68 victims, while SBM Intelligence recorded 80. The difference reflects variations in the datasets and methodologies used by the organisations, but both point to a significant security challenge. Recent data of kidnapping incidents from various security reports indicates that the situation has worsened.
A separate investigation published by Daily Trust in late 2025 reported that Kogi accounted for 212 of the 3,312 kidnapping victims recorded in the dataset it examined over a one-year period. It also attributed 35 deaths to kidnapping-related incidents in the state within that period.
However, these figures should be understood within the reporting periods and methodologies of the respective sources. They do not constitute a complete official count of all kidnappings in Kogi.
Further incidents reported in 2026 reinforced concerns about the persistence of the threat.
File photo of Bandits used for illustration
On August 9, armed men reportedly attacked travellers along the Ojuwo–Ajengo–Memarebo and Ojiwo–Itobe roads in Ofu Local Government Area. The Nigerian Army subsequently announced that 16 abducted people had been rescued through a joint operation involving military personnel, the police, the Navy, local vigilantes and hunters. A local hunter was killed during the operation, while a police officer sustained injuries.
On August 31, security forces rescued another 21 kidnapped road users in the Egume and Ochaja forest areas of Dekina Local Government Area. The operation followed reports of abductions along the Alloma–Ejule–Itobe road axis. One rescued victim had sustained a gunshot wound and was taken for medical treatment.
These operations demonstrate that security agencies have intervened in several incidents. They also expose the central contradiction in Kogi’s security situation: people can be rescued after being abducted, yet armed groups continue to find opportunities to attack travellers and retreat into surrounding forests.
The question is whether the state’s security arrangements are sufficiently preventive, coordinated and accountable to stop these attacks before they occur.
Kidnappings near security checkpoints: An allegation that demands investigation
Perhaps one of the most disturbing concerns raised by accounts attributed to kidnapping victims is that some attacks allegedly occurred near Army or police checkpoints.
If substantiated, such accounts would raise serious questions about checkpoint effectiveness, intelligence gathering, patrol arrangements and the possibility that some security personnel may be failing in their duties, if such allegations are proven.
It is important, however, to distinguish suspicion from proof. The reported proximity of an abduction to a checkpoint does not, by itself, establish that the officers stationed there were involved. Criminals may exploit gaps between patrols, attack unexpectedly, use alternative routes or move victims into nearby forests before reinforcements arrive.
Nevertheless, these possibilities make an investigation more necessary, not less.
Governor Usman Ododo should request a coordinated investigation by the appropriate police, military and intelligence authorities into credible testimonies involving attacks near checkpoints. Natives of communities where such incidents had become rampant should be carefully monitored to ascertain if they are involved in the unwholesome practice.
Investigators should compare victims’ accounts with incident logs, checkpoint duty rosters, patrol records, emergency calls, available CCTV footage, phone-location evidence obtained lawfully and other relevant intelligence.
Where there is evidence of misconduct, officers should be investigated and prosecuted through the appropriate legal processes. Where officers are cleared, the findings should help improve operational procedures and restore confidence.
The investigation should also examine whether checkpoint locations, operating hours and patrol patterns are sufficiently adapted to changing criminal tactics.
A checkpoint must not become merely a place where vehicles are stopped and inspected. It should form part of an active security network capable of detecting suspicious movements, communicating with neighbouring patrol teams and responding rapidly to emergencies.
The government owes residents an answer to a fundamental question: if criminals can repeatedly abduct travellers along known routes, what is being done to identify the operational weaknesses that allow them to succeed?
Identifying and securing the forests where victims are held
The forests surrounding vulnerable road corridors require urgent attention.
Kidnappers often depend on difficult terrain for concealment, movement and the detention of victims while ransom negotiations continue. Forests can provide cover, but they should not become spaces where criminal groups operate for extended periods without detection.
The Kogi Government should work with the police, military, intelligence agencies, forest guards and the relevant communities to identify forest corridors and locations credibly linked to kidnapping incidents.
This should be an intelligence-led exercise rather than an indiscriminate sweep of rural communities.
Security agencies should map reported abduction points, likely escape routes, forest access roads, locations where rescued victims have been found and other areas supported by credible intelligence. Information from victims, local hunters, farmers, forest guards and residents should be collected carefully and verified.
Once identified, high-risk areas should receive sustained surveillance, risk-based patrols and coordinated search operations. Security personnel must be equipped with reliable communications and a clear system for sharing intelligence between neighbouring commands.
Governor Ahmed Usman Ododo inspecting armoured vehicles acquired in support security agencies
The aim should be to prevent kidnappers from holding victims in captivity for days or weeks while negotiating ransom payments.
Local communities must be partners in this effort. Residents often understand the terrain, know the routes connecting villages and farms, and may notice unfamiliar movements that outsiders would miss.
Community cooperation, however, must be voluntary, safe and properly organised. Informants should have access to confidential reporting channels and protection against retaliation. Traditional rulers and community leaders should not be made responsible for criminal acts merely because they occur within their geographical jurisdictions.
The government should also ensure that forest guards and local security volunteers receive adequate training, supervision and logistical support. Poorly equipped or uncoordinated personnel may be unable to confront armed groups effectively and could expose themselves and innocent residents to additional danger.
More armed security personnel must be deployed along vulnerable highways
The repeated abductions of travellers demonstrate the need to review the number, positioning and operational readiness of security personnel along Kogi’s major highways.
The government should urgently work with federal security agencies to strengthen the deployment of armed, properly trained security teams along identified high-risk corridors.
These deployments should include coordinated mobile patrols, rapid-response teams, strategic observation points and reliable emergency communication arrangements. The objective should be to reduce the time between the detection of an attack and the arrival of help.
Neighbourhood watchers, native guards, local hunters and other recognised community-based security personnel can complement conventional security forces because of their familiarity with the terrain and surrounding settlements.
However, community-based security groups must operate under lawful supervision, clear rules of engagement, proper identification and effective accountability mechanisms. They should not be encouraged to act as unregulated armed groups or to take the law into their own hands.
The government should also consider structured collaboration with transport unions, commercial drivers, motor parks and community organisations to establish reliable reporting systems for suspicious movements and emergencies.
Drivers and passengers should be able to report an attack or a suspicious incident through a verified emergency channel without having to navigate an unclear chain of command.
The key is not simply to increase the number of uniforms on the road. It is to create a connected security system in which personnel can communicate, respond quickly and coordinate operations across local government boundaries.
CCTV cameras: Why the Lokoja–Otukpa corridor deserves urgent attention
One practical intervention that deserves serious consideration is the installation of CCTV cameras and other appropriate surveillance technology along vulnerable sections of Kogi’s highways.
Particular attention should be given to the Lokoja-to-Otukpa junction corridor in Benue State, as identified in concerns raised about recurrent attacks and kidnapping activities along the route.
The proposal should be based on a systematic assessment of reported incidents, traffic patterns, available infrastructure and the locations where surveillance would produce the greatest public-safety benefit.
The state government should work with federal road and security authorities to develop a highway-surveillance programme that combines strategically positioned cameras, reliable communications, secure monitoring facilities and coordinated patrols.
Where technically and operationally feasible, cameras could help investigators establish vehicle movements, identify suspicious activity, reconstruct reported incidents and preserve evidence for prosecution.
Surveillance should not stop at installing cameras and announcing the project. The system needs dependable power, maintenance, secure data storage, trained operators and clear procedures for transmitting relevant information to responding security teams.
Cameras alone cannot stop an armed attack. Their value lies in helping security agencies detect threats, respond faster and investigate incidents more effectively.
The government should therefore combine CCTV surveillance with regular highway patrols, mobile response teams and community intelligence.
Because the route extends towards Benue State, implementation will also require cooperation with the appropriate federal authorities and their counterparts in Benue. Criminals must not be able to exploit administrative boundaries to escape detection.
The public should be informed about the programme’s progress through non-sensitive performance reports, including the proportion of planned installations completed, system uptime and the number of investigations in which surveillance evidence has assisted law enforcement.
Monitoring herders’ settlements without collective punishment
Another issue requiring careful attention is the security monitoring of settlements and locations used by cattle owners and herders across the state.
Where credible intelligence identifies a settlement, camp or property as a possible base for kidnapping, the authorities must investigate it promptly. No settlement should be beyond the reach of lawful investigation simply because of its location, occupation or the identity of its occupants.
The government should strengthen lawful identification and monitoring arrangements in vulnerable areas, working with traditional rulers, pastoralist associations, community leaders and relevant security agencies.
Where appropriate and legally supported, cattle owners, herders, camp operators and other relevant parties could be required to register their locations and provide verifiable contact details to designated authorities.
The government could also establish written community-security commitments requiring participating settlement representatives to report credible information about kidnapping, cooperate with lawful investigations and refrain from knowingly harbouring or supporting criminal groups.
Such undertakings should be designed carefully, with clear legal authority, fair procedures and safeguards against arbitrary enforcement. They must not make an entire community automatically responsible for the criminal acts of an individual.
Fulani herders and cattle owners should not be presumed to be kidnappers because of their ethnicity or occupation. Equally, nobody should be shielded from investigation where credible evidence connects them to kidnapping or other serious crimes.
The same standards should apply to all residents, businesses, settlements and individuals, irrespective of ethnic identity, occupation, political connections or social status.
A fair and evidence-based monitoring system would help authorities distinguish legitimate pastoral activity from criminal conduct, improve information sharing and build confidence between security agencies and rural communities.
The objective must be to identify and disrupt criminal networks, not stigmatise an entire population.
What Governor Ododo has done so far
It would be inaccurate to suggest that the Kogi State Government has taken no action. Publicly documented measures under Governor Ododo include forest-guard recruitment, surveillance equipment, armoured patrol vehicles, support for local security personnel, restrictions intended to disrupt criminal logistics and cooperation with federal security agencies.
In June 2026, Ododo visited a forest-guard training camp and reiterated his intention to reclaim forests used by criminal groups. The state government said the initiative was being implemented in collaboration with federal security institutions.
The Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation also reported in January 2026 that the governor had unveiled two surveillance drones to support intelligence gathering and monitoring in difficult terrain.
The ministry subsequently reported the procurement of 50 armoured patrol vans, with five launched for deployment to Iluke and other security flashpoints.
The administration has also publicised measures involving local hunters and vigilantes, restrictions intended to disrupt criminal movements and a stated position against negotiating with kidnappers or paying ransom.
These initiatives are relevant and potentially useful. Yet, their existence does not automatically establish that the state’s forests and highways are now secure.
The government needs to demonstrate how many forest guards have been trained and deployed, where surveillance assets are being used, how patrol coverage has improved and whether the frequency of abductions has declined.
It should also provide information about suspects arrested, cases prosecuted, convictions secured and criminal networks disrupted, subject to legitimate operational and privacy restrictions.
The question is not whether the administration has announced security measures. It is whether those measures are delivering sustained protection for residents and travellers.
Why the current approach needs stronger accountability
Security operations are often judged by the number of people rescued or the equipment acquired. Those are important indicators, but they do not tell the entire story.
A rescue operation can save lives and demonstrate effective coordination. However, repeated abductions along the same corridor may indicate that prevention, intelligence or sustained patrol coverage requires further improvement.
Similarly, acquiring drones and armoured vehicles may improve operational capacity, but the public needs evidence that the equipment is being maintained and deployed where it is most needed.
The alleged proximity of certain attacks to security checkpoints adds another dimension to this accountability challenge.
The government should not presume that security personnel are complicit. It should equally not dismiss credible allegations simply because they are uncomfortable or could damage institutional reputations.
Public confidence depends on the ability of the authorities to investigate their own operations, identify genuine weaknesses and discipline or prosecute individuals where evidence warrants it.
The same principle applies to community-based security groups, local intermediaries and any individuals suspected of supplying information or logistical assistance to kidnappers.
No person should be above investigation, and no person should be declared guilty without evidence and due process.
Ransom payments and the criminal economy
Kidnapping for ransom is not merely an act of violence; it is also a source of income for organised criminal groups.
When abductors receive substantial payments, the proceeds can potentially be used to purchase weapons, transport, communications equipment and supplies or to recruit additional members.
A 2025 investigation by Daily Trust documented cases in which victims were reportedly killed despite ransom payments. One involved retired Major Joshua Musa, whose family reportedly paid ₦10 million. Another involved Pastor David Musa, for whom ₦1 million was reportedly paid.
These cases illustrate the dangers faced by families who are forced to negotiate with abductors. They do not establish a complete estimate of ransom payments across Kogi.
The authorities should strengthen investigations into the financial networks behind kidnapping, including individuals who knowingly facilitate ransom collection, weapons supply or other criminal activities.
At the same time, victims’ families must not be treated as criminals merely because they pay under coercion to save a loved one. The priority should be to protect captives, investigate perpetrators and reduce the conditions that make ransom demands profitable.
A practical security plan for Kogi
Governor Ododo’s administration should consider a coordinated programme built around seven priorities:
- Investigate checkpoint-related allegations. Establish a credible mechanism for examining victims’ testimonies, checking duty and patrol records, and investigating any evidence of misconduct or collusion.
- Map and secure forest hideouts. Use verified incident data, victim accounts and local intelligence to identify high-risk forest areas and sustain surveillance and coordinated patrols.
- Strengthen highway security. Increase properly equipped armed patrols and rapid-response capacity along corridors with repeated abductions.
- Install and maintain highway CCTV. Prioritise assessed hotspots, including the Lokoja–Otukpa junction corridor, and integrate cameras with staffed monitoring and emergency response.
- Organise community-based security. Work with trained forest guards, local hunters, neighbourhood watchers and recognised native guards under lawful supervision and clear accountability rules.
- Monitor settlements through evidence-based procedures. Establish lawful registration, reporting and cooperation arrangements with relevant community and pastoralist representatives without imposing collective blame.
- Publish measurable results. Release periodic security reports showing trends in abductions, rescues, fatalities, arrests, prosecutions and the deployment of security resources.
The implementation of these measures should be accompanied by cooperation among the Kogi Government, federal security agencies, neighbouring states, traditional institutions, transport organisations and affected communities.
Conclusion: The people deserve more than promises
Kogi’s kidnapping crisis requires urgent, coordinated and sustained action.
Governor Usman Ododo has publicised several security interventions, including forest-guard recruitment, surveillance drones, armoured patrol vehicles and collaboration with local security personnel. Documented rescue operations also show that coordinated security action can save lives.
But the continued reports of abductions make it necessary to examine what more must be done.
Allegations that some attacks occurred near security checkpoints must be investigated fairly and thoroughly. Forests associated with kidnapping must be identified and secured. Vulnerable highways require better patrol coverage, rapid-response arrangements and appropriate surveillance technology. Communities must become partners in security, while individuals credibly suspected of supporting criminal activity must face lawful investigation.
The government must also ensure that its security measures do not become instruments of collective suspicion against ethnic groups or rural occupations. Effective security depends on evidence, fairness, public cooperation and accountability.
Ultimately, the people of Kogi should not have to measure security by the number of vehicles launched, drones unveiled or assurances issued. They should be able to measure it by safer journeys, fewer or none abductions, the return of captives alive and the successful prosecution of those responsible.
The state’s forests should serve agriculture, livelihoods and community development, not become places where innocent Nigerians are held hostage.
For Governor Ododo, the urgent task is to turn security investments into measurable improvements in public safety. For the security agencies, it is to prevent attacks, respond quickly and ensure that allegations of misconduct receive serious attention. For the communities, it is to cooperate with lawful security operations without fear or discrimination.
The ultimate test of Kogi’s security architecture is whether ordinary Nigerians can travel through the state without fear of being abducted, whether families can live without the threat of ransom demands and whether criminal networks can be prevented from turning the state’s forests and highways into instruments of terror.
